Despite over 50 years of exploration campaigns by the Brazilian government and oil companies, the region’s potential reserves remain untapped. Efforts have been repeatedly stymied by setbacks ranging from mechanical accidents to license denials by Ibama, Brazil’s environmental agency.

In recent years, momentum has surged. Led by state-owned oil firm Petrobras and the Brazilian state, the oil sector is now leveraging political strategies to seize what might be the final chance to exploit the vast reserves before the global shift to renewable energy.

Sucuriju is situated along Brazil’s equatorial margin, a bio-diverse coastal region in the far north of South America. It extends from the northeastern tip of the continent to Brazil’s border with French Guiana, 2,000 kilometers west. This area includes Block 59 (FZA-M-59), which is designated for oil exploration. The site has become the center of a tug-of-war between Petrobras and Ibama about its environmental feasibility.

Petrobras holds a concession from ANP, Brazil’s Petroleum Agency, to explore the block, but it still requires an environmental license: The environmental license is a government authorization for ventures and projects that may have an environmental impact, ensuring the reduction of damage. In Brazil, it is issued by Ibama and regional entities. to kick off operations. The state-owned company argues that, with Ibama’s approval, it would conduct drilling 175 kilometers off the coast of Amapá state, asserting that the activity poses no significant socio-environmental risks. This argument is ed by other oil companies, elements of the government, and politicians advocating for the project.

“The project we’re licensing involves drilling a well, a temporary operation expected to last five to six months,” says Daniele Lomba, Petrobras’ licensing manager, at a public hearing in 2023.

However, our investigation uncovers a broader strategy: the license for Block 59 serves as a “smokescreen” to facilitate oil exploration across the entire Brazilian equatorial margin. This investigation is a segment of the cross-border project Every Last Drop, a special journalistic collaboration between four media outlets based in Amazonian countries that examines the oil industry’s impact on the region.

InfoAmazonia began researching this report in June 2024, conducting a thorough analysis of ANP data, securing internal government insights, interviewing dozens of sources, as well as compiling documents and public statements. These efforts reveal the forthcoming stages of oil exploration in the Brazilian Amazon.

The starting point of the investigation was Petrobras’ strategic plan for 2025-2029, which foresees drilling 15 wells along Brazil’s equatorial margin. The state-owned company plans to invest US$3 billion into this initiative. This investment s for 38 percent of the resources allocated for exploring new oil and natural gas areas during this period, covering efforts in both Brazil and Colombia.

The exploration plans become clearer upon examining ANP data regarding concessions for oil blocks: Oil blocks are parts of a sedimentary basin which have been officially designated for the research and production of oil and natural gas. Each block can be in different phases, such as study, bid or concession, depending on the exploration stage and the authorizations involved. Block sizes can vary depending on the region and its geological characteristics. on the equatorial margin through December 2024. The coastline from Amapá to Maranhão comprises 321 oil blocks. Of these, 25 have already been awarded: Awarded blocks are areas that are auctioned to or acquired by companies, which are granted the rights to research and produce oil and/or natural gas. to companies including Shell, BP, Brava Energia (formed from the merger of Enauta and 3R Petroleum), Prio, and Petrobras. The remaining blocks are still up for acquisition: 47 are available, while at least 250 remain in the study: Blocks in the study phase are areas delimited for oil and natural gas exploration that are still under analysis. At this stage, geological, seismic and environmental studies are carried out to assess the potential of the reserves before a possible bidding process. phase.

“A smokescreen has been created around Block 59,” says Suely Araújo, public policy coordinator at the Climate Observatory and former president of Ibama (2016-2019). 

The expert believes the initial phase of this operation is intended to “ease the process for other licenses,” potentially setting a precedent for exploring adjacent areas. Furthermore, it might “undermine Ibama’s authority,” as it makes it more likely that the body’s future decisions could be overturned due to external pressures.

Rodrigo Agostinho, the current president of Ibama, stated that the debate concerns “all oil exploration in a little-known region.” He told Bloomberg News in 2023: “It’s not a single well; that’s what we’re shouting about.”

In 2018, Suely Araújo, then president of Ibama, rejected five licensing requests from ’s Total Energies for blocks near Block 59 at the mouth of the Amazon. “I denied them because the conditions in the region are quite complex,” she says.

At that time, Block 59 was owned by the British company BP. Shortly thereafter, Ibama issued a statement declaring it “impossible” to conduct a thorough environmental assessment due to an incomplete application. The agency noted that the company had failed to meet the requirements of an emergency plan and recommended that the case be closed.

That year, the equatorial margin licensing dispute also reached Brazil’s Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office. A recommendation warned Block 59 posed a leakage risk, potentially jeopardizing the region’s already threatened fauna and Amazonian reef systems. The team also noted negative consequences for fishing villages like Sucuriju.

In 2020, Petrobras acquired six blocks on the equatorial margin from Total Energies and BP, despite the known licensing issues. In the oil industry, there is a consensus that only the Brazilian state-owned company, with its significant political influence and close government ties, could navigate these exploration challenges.

“If Petrobras, a Brazilian company with the government as its primary shareholder, can’t secure it, no one will get [Ibama’s authorization],” says João Correa, president of TGS in Brazil, a Norwegian firm conducting seismic surveys on the equatorial margin.

Décio Oddone, CEO of Brava Energia, which owns four blocks on the equatorial margin, expressed a similar sentiment to Reuters in 2024: “If Petrobras is authorized and finds something there, we will follow.”

While Petrobras is yet unable to open the door to oil exploration off the Amazon coast, other companies with nearby blocks are using loopholes to extend their concessions.

Under ANP regulations, missing contractual deadlines results in the blocks reverting to government control. On the equatorial margin, 20 out of 25 blocks awarded since 2013 have not begun work as required, which could lead to their discontinuation.

The agency allows deadline extensions in “fortuitous cases,” which are defined as beyond the control of operators. Using this reasoning, the oil companies are using the delays in environmental licensing to maintain active contracts.

The remaining five blocks, whose licenses were rejected in 2018, were slated to begin work by 2021. However, after Petrobras acquired these blocks, the licensing process was restarted, granting the state-owned company a new deadline of 2026 to submit updated studies. Since then, the emphasis has been on advancing Block 59.

One of the key controversies surrounding the licensing of Block 59 is the Environmental Assessment of Sedimentary Areas (AAAS). Established in 2012, this study aids government decisions on oil and natural gas exploration. While not required for all licensing, Ibama argues that an AAAS is warranted here, as the project opens up “a new frontier for the oil industry” in a region noted for its “significant biodiversity and socio-environmental sensitivity along the coast.”

Petrobras contests the requirement for an AAAS in licensing Block 59, citing a 2023 Federal Supreme Court decision. Justice Nunes Marques, the case’s rapporteur, stated, “the AAAS is not an instrument capable of attesting to the environmental viability of the project.” The lawsuit was initiated by the Rede Sustentabilidade party, which argued the assessment should be mandatory for hydrocarbon exploration and production projects.

Eight rusting fuel tanks in the center of Sucuriju stand as relics of Brazil’s equatorial oil rush over half a century ago.

In 1976, the British company Shell established an operational base in the village. Amiraldo Ferreira, a 69-year-old fisherman involved in its construction, recalls the comings and goings of the oil company’s employees.

“They used to land large helicopters right in the heart of the community to refuel, carrying between ten and twelve people. From here, they’d head out to sea in search of oil,” he says.

In the 1970s, newspapers promoted the Foz do Amazonas: The mouth of the Amazon, known as Foz do Amazonas, is the region where the Amazon River meets the Atlantic Ocean. It is on the coast of the Amazon rainforest, in the states of Amapá and Pará. as Brazil’s new frontier to achieve oil self-sufficiency. To boost exploration, the government permitted oil companies to operate, particularly at the river’s mouth, without promising compensation if oil was not discovered—an arrangement facilitated by so-called “risk contracts.” Before these contracts were banned in 1988, a total of 243 were signed.

This is how Shell’s venture in Sucuriju failed, leaving the company’s abandoned tanks repurposed as water reservoirs. Despite this setback, Shell maintains six inactive equatorial blocks in the Barreirinhas Basin, approximately 900 km away.

Shell and Petrobras also signed a memorandum of understanding in 2023 to explore new opportunities, including along the equatorial margin.  Last year, Shell CEO Wael Sawan presented President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva with a report urging “rapid and strategic political decisions” to capitalize on Brazil’s “untapped resources.”

In a statement to InfoAmazonia, Shell emphasized “the importance of the equatorial margin for the growth of the industry in Brazil,” arguing that its development would create jobs and income. However, it noted that “this is a government decision.” Shell and Petrobras did not provide additional details about the memorandum. The state-owned company only mentioned that “news will be communicated to the market.”

So far, the oil investment on the Amazon coast has caused more losses than profits, as well as exposing the risks of potential activities. Between 1970 and 2024, mechanical accidents disrupted at least a quarter of the 155 exploratory wells drilled in the equatorial margin, according to our analysis of ANP data.

In 1975, powerful sea currents demolished a Petrobras rig nearly 300 kilometers off the coast of Amapá state. In 2011, another rig owned by the state enterprise was damaged by the sea’s force, situated 126 kilometers from the mainland.

BP and Elf-Agip (now Total Energies) also signed risk contracts at the time. Their exploration campaigns, however, yielded no commercially viable oil and gas discoveries along the equatorial margin. The companies subsequently left the region for over two decades before returning in 2013 to acquire blocks in an ANP auction.

During the long hiatus, Sucuriju’s residents relied on the area’s rich biodiversity for their livelihood, primarily fishing. The village is surrounded by the Piratuba Lake Biological Reserve, a nearly 4,000-square-kilometer protected area near the mouth of the Amazon. Here, the confluence of river and ocean creates a vital breeding ground for migratory birds, sea turtles, and diverse marine life.

The oceanographic model presented by Petrobras during the Block 59 licensing process indicates that an oil spill at sea would not reach the coast, thereby sparing the rich ecosystem. This assertion is backed by representatives of the state-owned company.

Independent studies and Ibama assessments, however, contradict this finding. In 2023, the agency recommended against exploration of Block 59. “A major accident and any shift in the oil’s drift could cause unavoidable and unmitigable damage to sensitive, difficult-to-access areas of the Brazilian coast,” the agency warned.

Despite recommendations for its dismissal, political pressure kept the process open.  Ibama technicians have three times recommended rejecting the licensing of block 59 under the present Lula istration—in May 2023, October 2024 and February 2025. The agency consistently cites Petrobras’s insufficient plan to mitigate environmental impacts.

After Ibama initially rejected Block 59 in 2023, Minister of Mines and Energy Alexandre Silveira urged Petrobras to maintain its presence in the area. Meanwhile, Senator Randolfe Rodrigues, the government’s leader in Congress, parted ways with Environment Minister Marina Silva and exited the Rede Sustentabilidade party, which she founded, due to conflicts over the exploration of the equatorial margin.

In April 2024, a study conducted by the Institute of Scientific and Technological Research of the State of Amapá (Iepa), in collaboration with Greenpeace Brasil, challenged Petrobras’ proposal. The simulations suggested an oil spill in the Foz do Amazonas basin could impact vulnerable regions in Brazil and neighboring countries.

The research, led by Iepa professor Luís Takiyama, deployed seven drifters—oceanographic devices equipped with GPS—at various locations in the basin. About a week later, two reached the shore: the first at Sucuriju and the second, 150 kilometers southwest, at Caviana Island, which is also home to river dwellers.

“The two drifters we deployed closest to the shore moved rapidly toward it,” Takiyama says. “They exhibited a zig-zag movement, influenced by the tidal currents.” 

Further studies are needed to understand the “complex dynamics of sea currents” that have hampered shoreline exploration since the 1970s, Takiyama says.

The potential for oil spills along the Amazon coast is highlighted in other studies. A February 2024 article in Ocean Dynamics examined the paths of drifters deployed near blocks in the area. Of the 306 devices sent to depths exceeding two kilometers, 40 percent eventually reached the coast.

Even the North Coast Project, originally launched by Enauta and now led by its successor Brava Energia in collaboration with academic institutions, has confirmed the significant risk of coastal contamination from potential spills. Simulations indicated that preserved mangroves in three Brazilian states could be affected.

Despite simulations highlighting the risks of a spill in Sucuriju, the community has largely been excluded from the conversation. “We only found out about these projects recently,” says Fábio de Souza Vieira, a lifelong fisherman from the remote Amazonian village, in a September 2024 interview.

The community was excluded from debates, and Indigenous and quilombola groups— descendants of escaped enslaved people—potentially affected by the projects were not consulted.

Simultaneously, the prospect of oil development in Brazil’s northern region is gaining traction. This anticipation is propelling Oiapoque, the coastal town nearest to Block 59, forward. The municipality already houses an airfield to aid maritime exploration and is experiencing a population surge, which has inflated real estate values and spurred land speculation. The public forest adjacent to the air base has already been devastated. 

Miguel Caetano, the former mayor of Oiapoque and father of the current mayor, has found ways to benefit. He has rented property to Petrobras and asserts he has an agreement to increase this use. As of October 2024, Caetano was constructing a shed to serve as a base and expanding a hotel—both, he says, intended for the oil firm.

The progress of oil exploration was a key issue in the 2024 municipal elections in Oiapoque, yet skepticism is rising among its residents. Among them, Lawyer Joezer Silva Barros highlights concerns over the lack of transparency.

“There’s a lot of fog [around oil exploration],” Barros says, adding that the lack of detailed public discussion fuels the local misconception that “oil will save Oiapoque.”

The Uaçá Indigenous Land, located just six kilometers from the airfield, is already experiencing “the social impacts of exploitation that hasn’t even begun yet,” according to Luene Karipuna, a local resident. She notes the rise in air traffic over the area, which “scares away our game animals and influences social and spiritual life.” Karipuna also warns that unchecked regional growth “will put pressure on the territories.”

Oiapoque Indigenous leader Luene, appointed by the Council of Chiefs to lead discussions on oil exploration, says Petrobras is ignoring her.

In 2022, federal prosecutors recommended that Ibama not grant a license for Block 59 until a formal consultation with Indigenous peoples was conducted, as mandated by Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization: The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 169 is an international treaty adopted in 1989 and signed by Brazil. It establishes that Indigenous peoples must be consulted in advance about any measure that could affect their lands, natural resources and rights.. This process ensures their right to be informed beforehand and to voice their opinions on projects potentially affecting their territories and ways of life.

For this reason, the Oiapoque indigenous council is demanding comprehensive environmental assessments and effective consultations with the 55 villages in the region before Petrobras’ hearings.  They contend that Petrobras has not provided the required 15-day advance notice.

According to Luene Karipuna, local politicians visited the villages to transport Indigenous people to hearings without informing them about the purpose. “They don’t want to listen to us; they don’t want to consult with us,” the Indigenous leader criticized.

In 2023, Petrobras requested that Ibama revisit the licensing of Block 59. In its petition, the state-owned company included statements of for the project from a Karipuna Indigenous person, voiced during one of these hearings. However, Luene countered that this individual acted against the collective decision made by the Indigenous council, stating that he did not represent the community.

While Block 59 doesn’t overlap with Indigenous territories, oil spills would impact them, according to Environmental Oil Sensitivity Letters (Cartas de Sensibilidade Ambiental ao Óleo – SAO). These government-produced maps, required by international treaties  Brazil has signed, identify regions ecologically sensitive to oil.

The SAO Letters 2016 showed the high vulnerability of the Foz do Amazonas region. At least three Indigenous lands, including Uaçá, six quilombola territories, and 34 protected natural areas are at significant risk and could face irreversible damage from spills, our analysis shows.

The oil blocks at the mouth of the Amazon overlap with the Great Amazon Reef System, a rare and understudied ecosystem spanning approximately 9,500 square kilometers off the coast between Amapá and Maranhão states, as detailed in a 2018 article by Francini Filho and colleagues, published in Frontiers in Marine Science.

Professor Takiyama, a member of the team that developed the SAO charts for the Amazon River’s mouth, highlights that the combination of powerful sea currents and extreme tidal variations—which can span up to nine meters between low and high tides—dramatically complicates efforts to contain potential leaks.

“Imagine an accident under these conditions, with significant tidal variations, strong currents, and the critical issue of environmental preservation,” Takiyama says. “These areas have maximum vulnerability. It’s officially an area [that these oil projects] directly influence.”

In Amapá, 83.5 percent of the coastline is classified as highly sensitive to oil contamination by the SAO Charter. This area includes the world’s largest continuous stretch of mangroves, where removing pollutants would be extremely difficult.

Petrobras disputes the requirement to consult with the communities in advance, contending that the impacts cited by the Indigenous people would be merely indirect. The state-owned company also asserts that Ibama should have mandated the consultation during the licensing process, which did not happen.

Ibama, for its part, has stressed that even indirect impacts must be identified. When reached for comment, FUNAI, Brazil’s Indigenous Agency, stated that it had recommended evaluating the effects on the Oiapoque territories. The Ministry of Indigenous Peoples did not respond to requests for comment.

In September 2024, Sucuriju residents held their first community meeting to discuss the issue. “Petrobras is focused on exploration,” says Iriana da Silva, a local teacher and health worker,  “but they’ve never explained how it would affect our community.” 

Luene Karipuna has advocated for the inclusion of Indigenous voices in this discussion for five years. She criticizes how companies and both state and federal governments have assessed the impacts of exploration on the equatorial margin. “We are already experiencing the consequences of climate impacts. This is a risk for all of humanity, not just for us, not just for the peace and quiet of our territory, but for the entire planet.”